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Abstract 
Some instances of creative thinking require 
an agent to build and test hypothetical the­
ories. Such a reasoner needs to explore the 
space of not only those situations that have 
occurred in the past, but also those that 
are rationally conceivable. In this paper we 
present a formalism for exploring the space 
of conceivable situation-models for those do­
mains in which the knowledge is primarily 
probabilistic in nature. The formalism seeks 
to construct consistent, minimal , and desir­
able situation-descriptions by selecting suit­
able domain-attributes and dependency rela­
tionships from the available domain knowl­
edge. 
1 Introduction 
In this paper we describe a formalism for exploring 
the space of those situation-descriptions (also called 
models, scenarios, or theories) that may be consid­
ered rationally conceivable in a domain. This exer­
cise is the same as that of a controlled imagination 
process. Many aspects of such theory building activ­
ity, in the context of default logics, have been pre­
sented in [12]. Probabilistic knowledge derived from 
available databases of a domain has traditionally been 
used only for performing probabilistic reasoning. Our 
focus in this paper is to appropriately represent and 
use the probabilistic knowledge of a domain for per­
forming exploratory theory-building exercises. In the 
following sections we first make precise our notions 
for the following concepts : 1. The process of imag­
ination; 2. The form in which the probabilistic and 
qualitative domain knowledge are represented; 3. The 
requirements for a situation-description to qualify as 
an acceptable imagined scenariofcontezt; and 4. Some 
types of objectives that an agent may be pursuing dur­
ing the imagination process. We then discuss the com­
putational aspects of the construction of consistent, 
minimal and optimal scenarios by an imagining agent. 
2 The Scenario-Building Process 
The scenario building (or the imagination) process 
has been extensively examined and discussed by many 
philosophers and they have examined this activity in 
widely varying contexts such as science, literature, phi­
losophy, music, and painting. The scope of our for­
malism is limited to the imagination in the context of 
developing formal scientific (or other) theories. 
2.1 A Philosophical Perspective 
In his book The Origins of Knowledge and Imagina­
tion [1] Jacob Bronowski states ". . . every act of 
imagination is the discovery of likenesses between two 
things which were thought unlike". He gives the ex­
ample of Newton's thinking of the likeness between a 
thrown apple and the moon sailing in the sky. He fur­
ther states : . . .A ll act! of imagination are of that 
kind. . . . They take the closed system, . . . open the 
system up, they introduce new likenesses, whether it is 
Shake!peare saying, "My Mistres eyes are nothing like 
the Sunne" or it is Newton saying that the moon in 
essence is like a. thrown apple. In his view the acts of 
imagination in the context of scientific discovery pro­
ceed as follows. An initial theory exists in the form of 
a closed system consisting of some domain attributes 
and some causal dependencies that inter-connect the 
domain attributes. An investigation is triggered by ei­
ther an observation contradicting the theory or by a 
desire to enhance the scope of the theory by includ­
ing in it more attributes from the environment of the 
theory's domain. The investigator then needs to dis­
cover and include in the theory a new and satisfactory 
causal dependency. The task of investigator's imagi­
nation is to provide the candidate causal dependencies 
and it is the role of his critical judgment to select one 
dependency from among the imagined candidates. In 
his lecture Imagination and Science [6] J. H. Van't 
Hoff describes this mechanism in the words : "The so 
called occurring to mind results from a requisite survey 
of the possible case8 in one's mind and a definite 8e­
lection therefrom, i.e. combined efforts of imagination 
with the power of critical judgment are required." 
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The imagination process, as described above, gener­
ates candidate causal dependencies for building up a 
theory. A major source from which the investigator ob­
tains the candidate dependencies is the analogies and 
likenesses gathered by him from all the domains and 
theories known to him. A number of interesting sci­
entific theories owe their birth to such analogy based 
imagination process. In [4] Donald Crosby, while dis­
cussing the evolution of Maxwell's theory of electrical 
and magnetic fields, states : "A nalogie" with fluid flow, 
ela,tic nb6tance6, and whirling vortices had helped to 
bring the idea of the field into being, but once that 
idea had been given a firm mathematical description, 
the6e particular analogie" tended to drop into the back­
ground," and also, "Mazwell'" equation" faced back­
ward to Newton'" vi6ion of mechanical interaction" in 
a material medium and forward to belief in the con­
cept of the field." This analogy with the mechanics 
of fluid flow had helped Maxwell formulate the field 
theory which completely replaced the then prevalent 
and completely different notion of "actions at a dis­
tance" for explaining the effects of what we now know 
as electrical and magnetic fields. 
In the discussions by the above quoted authors the 
main focus has been on incrementally correcting or 
extending a theory by discovering appropriate causal 
dependencies among the attributes of a domain. Our 
computational formalism follows the spirit of perform­
ing imagination by discovering appropriate causal de­
pendencies and also generalizes the above incremental 
notion and seeks to hypothesize all the causal depen­
dencies for building a hypothetical - imagined- theory. 
Since we are working with probabilistic knowledge, we 
equate the concept of a specific theory with that of a 
specific probability distribution, also called a specific 
contezt by us. One main consideration for the formal­
ism is to decide on what dependencies can be extracted 
from probabilistic knowledge and then used as causal 
dependencies. 
While seeking to build a hypothetical theory the imag­
ining agent is constrained by the need to remain consis­
tent with the body of observed evidence and is guided 
by a wish to make some preferred and desirable infer­
ence in the imagined theory. The intere6tingneu of 
an imagined scenario to the agent, therefore, is deter­
mined by: 
1. A set E of constraining evenb. The occurrence 
of these events must be possible in the context of 
the hypothesized scenarios. 
2. A de6ired event, d. The probability of occurrence 
of the event d conditioned on the occurrence of the 
constraining events E in the hypothesized context 
S, written by us as P[d I E (S)], should be very 
high/low (as desired by the agent). 
The interestingneu criterion for focusing the imagina­
tion process is based on the perception that an imag­
ining agent is driven by the question - "what are tho6e 
possible contezts and scenario" in which the desired 
event 1d' would be very-highly/very-leu likely to oc­
cur?", irrespective of the probability of occurrence of 
the imagined contezt or 6cenario itself. Having imag­
ined the interesting contezts or scenarios, if the agent 
desires, he may take actions to alter the real envi­
ronment in a way to make the interesting scenarios 
more/less likely to occur. A scientist tries to imag­
ine those possible scenarios in which his experimental 
observations are explained and the result-proposition 
conjectured by him has a high probability of being 
true. A scenario similar to mechanical fluid flows was 
imagined to explain the observations in electrical and 
magnetic fields, and Maxwell's goal of having a set of 
equations as true in this imagined scenario is an ex­
ample of this type of imagination. 
A scientist, when in an exploratory mood, may not be 
interested in the mo6t reasonable explanation of his ex­
perimental observations but may seek those, possibly 
less reasonable, explanations in which hi" conjecture is 
most likely to be true. Imagination of such scenarios 
would guide him towards designing those experiments 
and seeking those observations which would turn his 
imagined scenario into the most reasonable one given 
all the observations. This kind of imagination pro­
cess is a precursor to seeking relevant evidence in the 
larger process of creative thinking. Such imagination 
process can be characterized only be a theory-building 
paradigm and not by a paradigm for reasoning in the 
context of a given theory. 
2.2 Abduction 
Abductive inference is easily understood through the 
following simple example given by Peirce in (11]. 
• The surprising fact, C, is observed. 
• But if A were true, C would be a matter of course. 
• Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. 
Here C is the observed fact and the second sentence 
states the dependency relationship, possibly causal, 
(and available from the domain knowledge) that the 
presence of A explains the presence of C. In the third 
statement, A is an abductively inferred hypothesis. 
The content of the inference is the premise "If A were 
true, C would be a matter of course." Given a G, an A 
which explains the occurrence of C must be discovered 
by the abductive reasoner. Many A's, each explaining 
the C, may exist in the reasoner's mid and he would 
have to choose one from all the possible candidates. 
The focus of many abductive reasoners [10, 13] has 
been on determining the most reasonable, that is, the 
par6imoniou6 or the mo6t probable or the lea6t cost 
[2, 14] hypotheses A, given the observed events G. 
The imagining agent is not necessarily seeking the 
most rea6onable scenarios. He is guided by the inter­
e6tingne66 of the candidate scenarios, while requiring 
only some minimal reasonableness from the hypothe­
ses. That is, an imagining agent seeks those A's in 
whose contexts Cis at least minimally explained (can 
possibly occur), but the intere.stingness of the hypoth­
esis is maximum. 
Interestingneu as a preference criterion is more gen­
eral than the most reasonable criterion. The probabil­
ity of an event of interest d inferred in the context of 
an imagined scenario is one possible criterion of inter­
estingness which can not be simulated by using either 
the probability of occurrence of a scenario or the costs 
associated with the components of a scenario. Size of 
a scenario is another possible criterion of interesting­
ness. 
In the following discussion the imagining abductive 
reasoner is given the interestingness criterion in terms 
of the probability of occurrence of a desired event d, 
conditioned on the occurrence of events in E, com­
puted in an imagined context S, and written as P[d I 
E (S)] by us. The agent's task is to build those hy­
pothetical contexts S in which P[d I E (S)] is very 
high/low irrespective of the probability of occurrence 
of the context S itself. The contexts and the scenar­
ios contained in them, however, must satisfy the con­
straints of consistency and should be minimal in size 
so as to exclude all irrelevant information. 
3 Probabilistic Knowledge 
For most domains the available knowledge falls into the 
following two categories : 1. A number of databases, 
each consisting of cases recorded in various contexts of 
the domain, and 2. Some qualitative or probabilistic 
domain dependencies acquired possibly from a theo­
retical understanding of the domain. Typically, the 
data part of a domain's knowledge is available in the 
form of a number of databases, each representing a 
different context of the domain. For example, in the 
domain of lung-diseases, databases may be available 
corresponding to different age-groups, different popu­
lation groups, different specialized disease classes, and 
different treatment strategies. Each database repre­
sents a specialized context, reflecting the conditions 
under which it was recorded. 
We denote by H = (h1, h2, • • •  h,.) the set of all the 
known and relevant attributes for a domain. We define 
a &ituation-description {scenario) of a domain to be a 
set T of attributes, along with their values such that 
T C H and T is non-null. By contezt we refer to a 
subset of some scenarios of the domain. In the lung­
disease example, each individual database mentioned 
above represents a specialized contezt of the domain of 
lung diseases, and approximates the joint probability 
distribution only for that contezt. 
One way in which a database of cases serves as a source 
for domain-knowledge is that we can extract from it 
the important inter-attribute dependencies. These de­
pendencies may take the form of conditional prob­
ability functions or the likelihood& used in Bayesian 
inference. Let us say that the set P contains suffi-
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cient number of conditional probability functions (de­
pendency relationships) derived from a database hav­
ing T as its set of attributes so that the pair < 
T, P > approximates the probability distribution re­
flected by the database. A different pair < T, P > 
for each contextual database represents the proba­
bility distribution approximated by its corresponding 
database. An example of dependencies learnt from 
a contextual database S is the set of probabilities 
P[sympt07'ni I disease; (S)]. Bayesian reasoning 
systems treat these likelihood dependencies as the in­
variants of the context S for performing probabilis­
tic inference. That is, the conditional probability 
P[symptom; I diseasei (S)J remains constant in 
the contextS, and is used as a dependency relation be­
tween the probabilities of the symptom and the disease 
events. The problem of compacting a joint probability 
distribution into the set P of important dependency re­
lationships has been extensively researched and some 
of the popular graph based representation methods 
have been presented in [3, 7, 8, 10). 
3.0.1 Abduction with Probabilistic 
Knowledge 
One type of abductive reasoning in a context S : 
< T, P > has been described in [8, 10] as follows. A 
set of observed attributes corresponding to attributes 
E1, E2, . . •  E,., (contained in set E where E C T) are 
given. That is, the instantiations E1 = eii have been 
fixed by the observations. The set A = (T - E) 
= (At, A2 ... , Am) represents all the unobserved at­
tributes of the context under consideration. The ob­
jective of the abductive exercise is to find an assign­
ment for each unobserved attribute A, such that : 
P[Al :::= a10, A2 :::= a2; . . . Am = am,.. I E1 = e101 • • •  
E,. = e�:r (S)j (1) 
is maximum among all possible sets of assignments to 
the attributes in set A. We say that Ah. refers to that 
set of assignments which results in the maximum value 
for the above probability. the content of the abductive 
exercise (in a manner parallel to Peirce's formulation) 
can be summarized as follows : 
• In context S the surprising events of the set E are 
observed. 
• But if assignments Ah were true, E would be a 
matter of course. 
• In the context S there is no other set of assign­
ments for the attributes of set A which is more 
likely to occur along with the occurrence of the 
observed events contained in set E. 
• Hence, there is reason to suspect that Ah is true 
about the observed situation. 
The third statement above says that the Ah selected 
is the most probable set of assignments, given the ob­
served evidence. This type of reasoning is in the spirit 
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of inductive reasoning where we seek the most reason­
able hypothesis given the observed events. The imag­
ining agent needs to perform a more widespread explo­
ration directed at the most interesting scenarios and 
not restricted to only the most reasonable explanations 
of the observations. 
3.1 Probabilistic Knowledge - "Imagination" 
Perspective 
One basic way in which the imagining agent's view of 
the probabilistic knowledge and reasoning differs from 
the traditional reasoning methods is as follows. The 
traditional methods consider a domain's probability 
distribution as a unified whole within which all rea­
soning activity is performed. The context invariant 
conditional probability functions is only a way of rep­
resenting the complete distribution. We consider an 
imagining agent who possesses the probability distri­
bution and the causal dependency ordering of all the 
attributes in the distribution. The latter knowledge 
may be available from a deeper understanding of the 
domain to which the database pertains. He orders the 
attributes according to their causal (may be partial) 
order and determines the context invariant dependen­
cies such that in the dependency P[a I B (S)J B is a 
set of attributes which are strictly causal predecessors 
of event a. For the imagination agent these causal con­
text invariant dependencies is all the knowledge that 
is needed. 
For the imagining agent the domain knowledge is rep­
resented by n contextual databases, < T1, P1 >,< 
T2, P2 > . .. ... < Tn, Pn > where the distribu-
tion < Tt, P, > represents the i1h context s, for the 
domain. It is possible that an attribute h E H 
may appear in more than one context and in such 
a case there may exist a dependency of the type 
P[h I a.su.bset.of.T; (Si)] in the set P; of every 
context S, that includes h. 
The various P,'s, therefore, represent the in"Variant 
dependencies for different contezt8 and are useful for 
probabilistic inference only within their respective con­
texts. 
3.1.1 Difference in Perspectives 
The main difference between the imagination agent 
and the traditional probabilistic inference is the fol­
lowing: 
• For traditional reasoning the only meaningful 
knowledge is a probability distribution < T, P > 
within which the instances of reasoning are per­
formed. 
• The imagining agent considers each invariant 
causal dependency, learnt from a particular con­
text, as a basic entity of the domain knowledge. 
As discussed in the section on philosophical per­
spective of imagination, the imagining agent feels 
free to use causal likenesses learnt from one con­
text to build and test other interesting hypotheti­
cal contexts. The context invariant causal depen­
dencies, therefore, are the basic units which the 
imagination agent considers as models of contex­
tual causal phenomena that can be used as build­
ing blocks for building the descriptions of other 
hypothetical contexts. 
The conte.ztu.al causal dependencies learnt from indi­
vidual contexts are reflective of the underlying causal 
processes for the context and therefore are viewed 
as possible causal building blocks from which other 
possibly not yet encountered, contexts may be con� 
structed. The causal dependencies learnt from a com­
plete domain's probability distribution can be seen 
as weighted accumulations of the causal dependencies 
of individual contextual databases. Therefore, an in­
stance of abductive reasoning with probabilistic knowl­
edge in the traditional sense would not be following the 
process of selecting some causal dependencies and leav­
ing out the other. It would be aggregating over all the 
known causal dependencies that affect any particular 
attribute. 
The analogical thought as practiced by the imagin­
ing agent is similar to the capacity of a thinker to 
visualize a concept in a hypothetical context, different 
from the one in which it was learnt. In the context 
of probabilistic knowledge, the invariant dependencies 
characterizing a context are placed in a different hypo­
thetical contezt by the imagining agent to imagine the 
descriptions of hypothetical scenarios. This capabil­
ity is, arguably, the foundation of imagination process 
as discussed earlier, which in turn is the foundation of 
creativity. Theory building using defaults and default­
logic has been presented in [12] and in our case the 
causal context invariant dependencies may be seen as 
analogous to the defaults which may or may not be 
applicable in any particular situation. 
When we mix and match the contextual dependencies 
learnt from disparate contexts to hypothesize new con­
texts we don't have enough information to determine 
the probability of occurrence of this new concocted 
context. This is because the marginals represented 
by the contextual databases are not sufficient to con­
struct the complete joint distribution from which the 
probability of occurrence of a particular context may 
be determined. Since our formulation of an imagin­
ing agent, as explained in the previous section, does 
not need to determine the probabilities of occurrence 
of various scenarios, the above shortcoming is not of 
much significance. 
The abduction exercise that the imagining agent needs 
to perform can be stated as follows. 
• The surprising events contained in the set E are 
observed. 
• But if the context were to be Sh, represented by 
< Th, Ph > then E would be a matter of course. 
• There is no other context S in which P[d I 
E (S)] is greater than what is obtained in the 
contextS". 
• Hence, there is reason to suspect that S" is the 
most interesting context and the various scenar­
ios obtained from s� (by making attribute assign­
ments) are the most interesting scenarios. 
The main difference between this abduction formula­
tion and the one described in section 3.0.1 can be seen 
in terms of the second ab.d the third statements of the 
abduction formulation. The imagining agent is seek­
ing to hypothesize that context in which interesting 
inferences can be made and the traditional reasoner is 
trying to hypothesize the most probable scenario in a 
given context. The computational problem of the tra­
ditional reasoner's abduction, as presented in [8, 10], 
is to find the most suitable assignment A" in a given 
contextS. The corresponding problem for the imagin­
ing agent's abduction task is to construct the context 
s" by selecting an appropriate subset TIL from the set 
of domain attributes H and an appropriate subset P,. 
from the set of all the known contextual invariant de­
pendencies, such that the probability of occurrence of 
din sk meets the interestingness criterion. 
4 The Dependency Relation 
For each contextual database of a domain, we can rep­
resent the joint probability distribution by the pair 
< T, P > where the set P may contain either all the 
Chow dependencies (3], or all the Bayesian dependen­
cies (8, 10], or all the qualitative dependencies known 
from a theoretical understanding of the domain. 
We define a relation D for the complete domain, in­
cluding information from all its contextual databases, 
such that 
n-1 
D � U {H;xH}where H; = HxHx ... xH, i times 
i=l 
(2) 
where H is the set of all the attributes in all the 
contextual databases, domain{D} = U:,;11 {H;} and 
range{D) =H. This relation has the same character as 
the set P of a joint probability distribution. The dif­
ference is that D contains all the dependencies learnt 
from all the contextual databases or the qualitative 
knowledge of the domain and it does not necessarily 
constitute a consistent description of a joint probabil­
ity distribution. 
To construct the dependency relation D for the com­
plete domain we repeat the following with each avail­
able contextual database. We first order (or partial 
order, if sufficient knowledge is not available) the at­
tributes of the database in such a way that each at­
tribute is followed in the sequence by only those that 
can possibly causally influence it. Given this order­
ing of attributes, we determine the sets of Bayesian 
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network dependencies, and the known qualitative de­
pendencies for the database. A union of all these sets 
is the contribution of this contextual database to the 
dependency relation D of the complete domain. The 
relation D therefore contains all the dependencies de­
rived from each available contextual database. From 
the perspective of traditional probabilistic reasoning D 
is an unnatural and meaningless medley of conditional 
probability functions but for the imagining agent the 
relation Dis the source from which to derive the candi­
date causal dependencies to build a hypothetical the­
ory. The issue of maintaining some consistency has 
been addressed in a later section. 
For the imagining agent the elements of set D are in­
dependent entities in the sense that a particular de­
pendency can be used without worrying about the 
probabilistic dependence of its consequent attribute 
on some other attributes of the context not included 
in the dependency. This is because in a Bayesian de­
pendency a consequent node is in fact probabilistically 
independent given the antecedent attributes of the de­
pendency. Therefore, by using these dependencies the 
agent is not making any assumption about any prob­
abilistic independences. The independence among de­
pendencies is a characteristic of the way the Bayesian 
or other dependencies are constructed. 
5 Structure of an Imagined Context 
The task of the imagining agent is to hypothesize a 
contextS" such that P[d IE (S")J is in accordance 
with the interestingness criterion. The interestingness 
criterion may seek this probability value to be mini­
mum, maximum, or satisfy some specified constraint. 
The description of the context S" consists of the pair 
< T�., Ph >, specifying some joint probability distribu­
tion. It is an arbitrary, imagined distribution but must 
be consistent as a description of a distribution. Imag­
ining a contezt, therefore, is the same as construct­
ing a relevant, complete and consistently specified ap­
proximation of a probability distribution by using the 
known dependencies as building blocks. An analogy 
with building consistent theories using defaults in de­
fault logic [12] can be drawn here. Our context build­
ing task is accomplished by selecting an appropriate 
set of dependencies from the domain dependency re­
lation D. However, any arbitrary choice for the set 
Pk may not be an acceptable description of a context. 
The constraints that a hypothesized context S" must 
follow are the following: 
1. Sufficiency : A hypothesized context < T,., Pk > 
is considered sufficient if all the constraining at­
tributes (E) and the event of interest d are in­
cluded in the set Th. The objective of sufficiency 
criterion is to ensure that in the imagined contexts 
the probability of occurrence for each constraining 
event can be computed. Only those hypothesized 
contexts are of interest to the imagining agent in 
which scenarios with non-zero probabilities for all 
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the constraining events can be constructed. 
2. Consistency : A hypothesized context is consid­
ered consistent if it is a complete and consistent 
description of a joint probability distribution -
even though a completely hypothetical joint prob­
ability distribution. 
3. Minimality : A hypothesized context is considered 
minimal if it contains only those attributes and 
dependencies that are needed to show the possi­
bility of occurrence of the constraining events and 
the high/low probability of the occurrence of the 
desired event. 
5.1 A Sufficiently Large Context 
A hypothesized context that is sufficiently large in de­
scription should : 1. Include the attribute d corre­
sponding to the event of interest .  2. Include the con­
straining attributes contained in the set E. 3. Include 
a subset R of the dependency relation D such that 
their associated conditional probability functions de­
fine a complete joint probability distribution. 4. Be 
an Ezplanation for the occurrence of the desired event 
d and the constraining events E. 
In the abduction example given by Peirce in [11] the 
abductive hypothesis A is considered an explanation 
of the observed event C. In this same spirit, w our 
notion of an explanation is as follows : 
5.1.1 A Contezt as an Explanation 
Each conditional probability function in D, say 
derived from a Bayesian network, P(node.n J 
parents.of(node.n) (S)] represents a dependency 
o£ the context represented by the Bayesian network. 
The dependencies selected for constructing a hypoth­
esized context can be arranged in a graphical network 
to show the unique Bayesian Network that they repre­
sent. We define a path in the graphical representation 
of a context as follows : 
Definition : A path from a node (attribute) 111 to a 
node VA: in a context < T, R > is defined as a sequence 
{vt, Wt1 va, wa . . . Wk-1, v,_}, where each w, E R, 
each v, E T, and for each w; 
1. either v; +1 or u; is its consequent node and the 
other is its antecedent node; 
2. no v; is the consequent node of both Wj-1 and 
w1; and 
3. no v0 or wi is repeated in the sequence; 
4. VA: is not an antecedent node of any w, included 
in the sequence. 
(end-definition) 
The conditions in the above definition ensure that each 
path : 1. is a connected sequence of causal dependen­
cies; 2. is non-cyclical; and 3. connects vertices 111 and 
v�; without containing a vertex which is a causal de­
scendent of both Vt and v�;. A context description can 
also be viewed as a collection of various such paths. 
We consider Peirce's description of abduction again 
and replace in it the fact A above by a path of depen­
dencies, the observed event C by a pair of attributes, 
and the explanation A by a the path. The resulting 
reformulation of Peirce's example can be stated as fol­
lows: 
• The surprising events, e, and e; are observed to 
occur 
• If the path of dependencies A between these two 
observed events were to be active in a context 
then e.; and e; would have occurred as a matter 
of course. 
• Hence, there is reason to suspect that the path of 
causal. dependencies A is active in the situation. 
The content of the above inference is the premise "If 
the path of dependencies A were active, the events e, 
and e; would occur as a matter of course." The path A, 
therefore, is a possible explanation for the occurrence 
of the two events. 
The above definition of an explanation restricts the 
contexts that can be hypothesized by the imagin­
ing agent. The agent is restricted to explain each 
constraining event in relation to another constrain­
ing event, or the event of interest. A single attribute, 
with a single dependency containing the attribute as 
its consequent node, may also be considered as a pos­
sible explanation of an event corresponding to the at­
tribute. This latter definition, however, results in a 
large number of trivial explanations in which no con­
straining event is connected either to another con­
straining event or to the desired attribute. Imposing 
the above more restrictive, definition of an explana-, . 
tion forces the imagining agent towards those imagmed 
contezts in which the attributes are relatively much 
more connected to each other. The contezb with the 
more liberal definition of an explanation are also valid 
from the imagination perspective but are more discon­
nected as hypotheses and add more complexity to the 
computational process of constructing the interesting 
contezts. 
5.1.2 Contents of a Context 
A 111.jficiently large context Sh. is one in which the pos­
terior probability P[d IE (Sh.)] and the probabilities 
P[( e, E E) (Sh )] can be computed and it is an e��la­
nation in the above described sense of the constrrumng 
and the desired events. 
We say each element� of D has the form (z, y) where 
y is the consequent attribute of d, and z is the set 
of antecedent attributes of d;. We define the func­
tions conseq(d,), antec(d;), conseq•(r), and antec•(r) 
as follows: 
• conseq(d,) is the attribute yin the pair (x, y) of 
dt. 
• antec(dt) is the set of attributes :z: in the pair (:z:, y) 
of dt. 
• conseq* (R), where R c;; D, is the set of attributes 
containing conseq( di) for each di E R, and con­
tains no other attributes. 
• antec*(R), where R c;; D, is the set of attributes 
containing antec(di ) for each di E R, and contains 
no other attributes. 
A Sufficient description of a context ts the pair < 
T, R > such that : 
1. T c;; H, E s; T, dE T 
2. R� D, 
3. d E conseq* ( R) 
4. E C conseq*(R) 
5. There is a path from each e, to either the attribute 
d or another constraining attribute e;, and there 
is a path from d to at least one ej. 
The third and the fourth conditions stated above im­
ply that a hypothesized context must include depen­
dencies that have d and all the members of E as con­
sequent nodes. That is, we must include in the hy­
pothetical context those dependencies which can be 
viewed as the causes for the occurrence of d and the 
members of E. The fifth condition states that in a suf­
ficiently large context each event, in conjunction with 
some other event of interest has been explained. This 
condition would cause many nodes, other than d and 
the constraining events, to be included in set T. 
A sufficiently large pair < T, R > selected as above 
would be an acceptable context only if the dependen­
cies in R constitute a consistent description of a joint 
probability distribution. 
5.2 A Consistent Context 
The notion of consistency of a hypothesized context 
is derived from the perspective of a context being the 
same as a probability distribution. That is, a context 
< T, R > is consistent only if the dependencies in R 
completely describe a joint probability distribution for 
the attributes in T. This consistency condition ensures 
that the resulting context is neither under-specified 
nor over-specified. Using the chain rule and deleting 
those conditioning attributes which are not a part of 
the dependency relationship, the joint probability dis­
tribution for the attributes of the set T can be written 
as :  
P[tlt t2, . .. tm] = P[tl I Gt] * P[t2 I G2] * ... 
*P(tm-1 I Gm-1] * P(tm] where(3) 
G, c;; { ti+11 ti+2• . . .  , tm}. The similarity between the 
above expansion and a context being hypothesized is 
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that each product term on the right hand side is a 
dependency in R which helps constitute the hypothet­
ical context. Keeping in mind such an expansion for 
a probability distribution, we should 'construct a con­
text < T, R > by including in R dependencies from 
the domain dependency set D such that : 
1. there is one and only one dependency in R corre­
sponding to each product term of equation 3; 
2. each product term and the corresponding depen­
dency in R have exactly the same attributes and 
in the same relative positions; and 
3. set R includes no other dependencies; 
A pair < T, R > that follows the above correspondence 
completely and consistently describes some hypotheti­
cal joint probability distribution without either under 
or over specifying it. 
For some given d and E it is possible to select a number 
of different subsets R from the set D such that each of 
these choices consistently describes a joint probability 
distribution. The objective of the imagining agent is 
to prefer those contexts in which the probability of the 
desired event is maximum/minimum (as desired). 
5.3 The Minimal Context 
A hypothesized context < T, R > is considered mini­
mal if the following are true : 
1. Removal of any dependency r E R from the con­
text would disrupt a path between either attribute 
d and an attribute e0 E E, or between attributes 
e, E E and e3 E E. 
2. Every t E T is included in at least one r E R. 
A path is the abductively hypothesized explanation 
for all the consequent nodes included in the path. The 
above definition of minimality implies that we don't 
want any such dependencies in the context that are 
not playing a role in explaining the occurrence of ei­
ther the attributes d or a constraining attributes. It 
should, however, be noted that a contezt in the above 
defined senses of sufficiency, consistency, and minimal­
ity can be a set of disjoint directed acyclic graphs. 
Each Bayesian Network is a directed acyclic graph [10] 
if we assume a direction in each dependency from the 
antecedent nodes to the consequent node. 
With the constraints on an acceptable Context spec­
ified, we now examine the computational framework 
for constructing the contexts in which scenarios with 
desired probabilities values for the events of interest 
can be constructed. 
6 Constructing Preferred Contexts 
The computational task of constructing the optimal 
contexts is formulated by us as a state-space search 
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guided by an admissible heuristic function. The AI 
search algorithm A • given in [9] has been directly em­
ployed in our implementation. Each 8tate is a partially 
constructed context < t, r > where t C T and r C R 
of some completely described context < T, R >. In 
the start state the set t contains the attribute d and 
all the constraining attributes contained in the set E. 
To maintain the minimality and the consistency of the 
resulting context-description, a. dependency d E D can 
be added to the set r of a. state < t, r > only if the 
following hold : 
• con8eq( d) E ( t U antec• ( r)) , and 
• conseq(d) � conseq*(r). 
That is, only that dependency can possibly be added 
to a. state whose consequent node already exists in the 
state and there is no other dependency in the state 
with the same consequent node. The successor states 
of a search state are all those states that are obtained 
by adding one dependency to the parent state. It can 
be seen with little reasoning that each possible con­
text description that is consistent and minimal can be 
built using the above incremental step of adding one 
dependency at a time. Also, all context descriptions 
that are built using the above constrained incremental 
process are consistent. The minimality is guaranteed 
by stopping the incremental steps as soon a sufficiently 
large context has been created. 
The goal state S for the search algorithm is that com­
pletely described context in which each constraining 
attribute e, is connected by a path to either the at­
tribute d or another constraining attribute e1. That 
is, the the sufficiency requirements for a context as 
discussed in section 5.1 are satisfied. 
Tha A • search algorithm can yield the best, the sec­
ond best, etc. hypotheses until all possible hypothet­
ical contexts have been generated. The capability to 
output multiply hypothetical contexts, rank ordered 
according to their interestingness, is a very desirable 
aspect of an imagining agent. Some computational 
formalisms [10] can only compute the best or the best 
and the second best hypotheses and this would be an 
undesirable restriction on an imagining agent. 
The next important aspect of the A • search algorithm 
is the heuristic function used for ordering the partially 
constructed contexts. If the Merit Function whose 
value must be maximized by the desired context is 
given by 
F(S) = (P[d = dr IE (S)]) (4) 
then in order for the search to be admissible, we need 
an estimating function W(ss) such that 
• u is a partially constructed context, and 
• the value W(ss) � F(S) where Sis any complete 
conte:z;t that can be constructed by adding more 
dependencies to ss. 
With an admissible estimating function we are guaran­
teed to get the optimal contezt as its first output from 
the A • search. Further contezts, in order of decreas­
ing merit value can also be obtained by continuing the 
search process. 
For the Merit function F(S) specified above, an esti­
mating function W(ss) can be specified as follows: 
W(ss)=(max P(d=drla,b,c, ... g (h)]) (5) ,,,,k ... n 
where h is that dependency which has d as its con­
sequent node, and a, b, c etc. are those antecedent 
attributes of h that lie on a path which can possibly 
exist in an extended version of the state ss. We can 
show by simple arithmetic that W(ss) is indeed an 
upper bound on F(S) as required above. 
Proposition :Considering that S refers to a com­
pleted contezt, and ss is a partially constructed con­
text of S, the estimating function W(ss) as described 
above computes a value that is not less than P[d = dr I 
E (S)] for all those S that can be generated from ss 
by addition of more dependencies. 
Proof: Since S is a consistent context, the attribute 
d in it can be the consequent node of only one depen­
dency (according to the conditions of consistency of a 
context). Let us say this dependency is h and a, b, 
c ... g etc. are its antecedent nodes. If E is the set of 
constraining nodes included in S then we can say that 
P[d = dr I E  (S)] = L (P[d = dr I ai 1\ b,. 1\ .. gr (S)] 
j,k . .l 
(6) 
The first product term on the right hand side above 
represents the conditional probability values for the 
dependency h and the second term represents the 
probability computed for the antecedent attributes 
based on the constraining events. The right hand side 
of the above expression can be rewritten as : 
j,k .. l 
(7) 
This expression can be viewed as 
r 
where a.: 's correspond to the first terms and :c;'s to 
the second terms of the product. Since the sum of 
the probability values for all the events in a consistent 
context must be one, we can say that 
Considering this constraint, we can say that 
ma:c (L a.:* :c.:) = max( a. ) . 
• i 
(8) 
That is, for the Merit function under consideration we 
can say that 
max( P [d = dz I E  (S)] ) = 
maxj,L.I (P [d = dz I ai 1\ bk 1\ . .  9l (h)]) .  (9) 
(End-Proof) 
The above described search process would therefore 
stop when a pair < T, R > has been constructed in 
which the probability of occurrence of the event d = dz 
is the maximum among all possible contezt& that can 
be constructed given the constraining events, desired 
event , and the storehouse of dependencies, the rela­
tion D, from which the imagining agent can select the 
causal dependencies. 
The selected merit function is a very simple interest­
ingness criterion and the suggested estimating func­
tion is also a very weak upper bound on the merit 
function. More intelligent estimating functions, that 
are stronger upper bounds on F(S) can be designed. 
The imagining agent can also attempt variations of the 
merit functions to achieve different types of objectives 
for the imagination exercise. 
The imagining agent, thus, can produce hypothetical 
situation descriptions that are sufficient, consistent , 
and minimal for an imagination task. The imagined 
contexts need not be possible in the real world but 
they are only conceivable by an imagining mind. The 
actions that should be taken based on the imagination 
of a conceivable situation descriptions is the next step 
after the imagination task. 
7 Conclusion 
Intelligent systems have tended to use the probabilis­
tic knowledge of a domain for traditional probabilistic 
reasoning alone. The task of constructing the conceiv­
able contexts and scenarios of a domain requires that 
we move away from the most probable, the most likely, 
or the least cost focus of the inductive probabilistic in­
ference. We have presented in this paper a formalism 
for using the probabilistic knowledge available in a do­
main, by methods different from those of traditional 
probabilistic reasoning. We have defined the nature of 
sufficient, consistent, and minimal hypothetical con­
texts that can be conceived by an imagining agent and 
have briefly outlined an AI search based computational 
formalism for arriving at the interesting imagined hy­
potheses. We have presented justifications of this for­
malism from the perspective of an imagination process 
and have highlighted the differences between an imag­
ination formalism and a reasoning formalism using the 
probabilistic knowledge. 
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